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Following a series of incidents in the late 1960's - including
the PUEBLO, LIBERTY, and EC 121 - the ineffectiveness of the existing
communications system became apparent. The call went out to "get the
people out of the system" by automating as many manual functions as
possible. The LDMX is one of the first systems designed to correct
those problems which has become operational.
Following the introduction, Section II describes the system
architecture and the sequence of operating events involved in message
processing under this system. Section III presents the requirements
which must be met in evaluating such a system and reviews the approach
that was taken in meeting them. Two measures of effectiveness are
proposed for utilization in evaluating the performance of the LDMX.
An additional effort is made to develop several evaluation techniques
that could be helpful in developing follow-on systems to the LDMX.
Section IV concludes the paper with a brief summary and a discussion
of two reports which have had a significant impact on military communi-
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I. INTRODUCTION
During recent years greater emphasis has been placed on evalu-
ating proposed Department of Defense investments on a cost-effectiveness
basis than on any other single methodology. SECNAVINST 7000.14
[Ref. 13, p. l] states that such a technique affords significant advan-
tages to the military manager including:
1.) A systematic identification of the costs and benefits
associated with resource requirements so that a
useful comparison of alternative methods for accom-
plishing a task can be made;
2.) Highlighting the key variables and the assumptions
on which investment decisions are based to allow
evaluation of these assumptions;
3.) Evaluating alternative methods of financing the
investments (e.g., whether to lease or buy); and
4.) Comparing the relative merits of various alternatives
as an aid in selecting the best alternative.
In the actual execution of such studies there has been significant
progress in a number of areas, such as weapons system acquisition
to give one prominent example. Comparing several rifles on the basis
of range, accuracy, reliability and weight and then trading off these
effectiveness criteria against the costs involved can yield very meaning-
ful results to a military manager. Similar tradeoffs can be made on
items ranging all the way from aircraft to mess kits.

. Unfortunately, Naval Communicators have not been able to apply
these techniques to their programs as readily as have their counter-
parts in other fields. Not only has it been very difficult to identify
communications assets and to place an accurate price tag on a partic-
ular communications system with any degree of confidence; but in
addition, it has been impossible to adequately identify the benefits
that are realized from a given system or even how these benefits should
be measured. Indeed, there are those who persist in claiming that
communications are unmeasurable and that no degree of effort will
ever permit a full evaluation of communication assets.
With primitive managerial techniques and unenlightened approaches
to the problem, which are essentially non-approaches, it is clearly
evident why military communications in general and Naval Communi-
cations in particular have come under severe criticism in recent years.
The impetus for changing the manner of approaching military
programs within the Department of Defense has come about quite
naturally as a result of the increasing sophistication, complexity and
expense involved in present day systems. This is accompanied by
the growing demand from other sectors of the economy for a larger
slice of the national fiscal pie. Together the resulting situation is
one in which the expenditure of each military dollar must be fully




The objective is to discuss certain modern managerial techniques
and to apply them to an ongoing system within the framework of Naval
Communications, keeping in mind the context within which we are
operating today. Looking at the overall Navy picture, there are
currently three areas of interest in the field of communications which
provide possibilities for examination: (1) the Fleet Satellite Program;
(2) the secure voice problem; and (3) the Naval Communications
Automation Program. The first two were ruled out primarily due to the
fact that it will be several years before they will be implemented.
Only the automation program is actually being implemented at the
present time and thus is the only pertinent program that offers a factual
enough background upon which to conduct a definite analysis.
Having selected this program, only the Local Digital Message
Exchange (LDMX) portion will be reviewed in detail here in order to
keep the paper to a manageable level. The objective is to consider
all of the aspects of the LDMX in detail and to develop a methodology
for evaluating its effectiveness compared to the effectiveness of the
manual or semi-automated message centers currently in existence.
The approach is basically three-pronged. First is an analysis
of the system as it now exists, including the system objectives and
architecture. This is preceded by a review of how the program system
initially came into being.

The second phase, Section III, will discuss several considerations
which must be taken into account in evaluating a system such as the
LDMX. Included will be a description of the current program which
is being used to evaluate the LDMX. It will be demonstrated that such
an approach does not completely meet all the requirements which must
be satisfied in such an analysis. Several proposals for possible
methods of providing a more complete analysis are set forth.
The third and final phase presents two important reports - the
Mollohan Report and the CIACT Report - which have been published
in the past two years. The significant impact these reports have had,
and will have, on the application of automated techniques to military
communication problems will be pointed out. The final phase concludes
with a summary which briefly recaps the primary thrust of the paper.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
AUTOMATION PROGRAM 1
The primary objective of the Naval Communications Automation
Program is to obtain a fully automated Naval Communication system
which satisfies overall requirements for speed, reliability, security,
and systems compatibility.
The shore based portion of this program under development by
the Naval Communications Command consists of two interrelated
systems: the Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) and the Naval
Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) . These
systems are designed to assist in achieving the objectives of Naval
Communications through the application of modern ADP technology and
procedures. The approach is to automate key nodal points of the Naval
Communications System utilizing the latest devices such as Optical
Character Readers, high speed reproduction equipment, Video Display
Terminals, remote entry/display devices, and direct on-line computer
interfaces, all operating under central processor control.
The afloat portion of the program is being undertaken by the
Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC). Because of the complications
The information in this section is drawn from Refs . 4, 7, 8, and
10. The interested reader should consult these references for a more
complete treatment of this material.

inherent in a shipboard environment, progress in this area has been
rather limited. To date, NELC has developed several prototype auto-
mated and semi-automated systems, some of which have been installed
and operationally tested aboard ship. Overall however, the progress
attained afloat in automation has not been as significant as ashore
and further analysis of this program is left to future students.
A. BACKGROUND
Within the Navy there are two major problem areas in message
processing: (1) the ship-shore interface, and (2) staff internal routing.
Because the staff internal routing problem appeared to lend itself
to easier solution, this problem was attacked first, with an RCA 301
being installed in the Pentagon in 1964. It was programmed to assign
some seventeen thousand distribution combinations for the Secretary
of the Navy and CNO Staff. In 1966, another RCA 301 was installed
in Norfolk at the CINCLANTFLT Telecommunications Center. It was
larger than the Pentagon system and provided in- staff distribution,
file and recall, statistical reporting, and several other functions. In
1967, a third RCA 301 was installed in the CINCPACFLT Telecommuni-
cations Center at Pearl Harbor. A fourth and final RCA 301 was in-
stalled at Main Navy - now at Crystal Plaza in Washington, D.C.
This latter installation was programmed to serve several larger collo-
cated commands. This was the first real attempt at automating and
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consolidating smaller and separate telecommunications centers. It
should be noted that in each of these installations only the processing
of incoming traffic was performed.
Several false starts were made in attacking the ship-shore
interface problem and progress was not as rapid as desirable. During
the build-up of forces in South East Asia, tremendous traffic backlogs
were experienced at Naval Communications Station Philippines. To
relieve this situation a large UNFVAC 418 system was installed. The
system was expensive and ran into numerous installation problems,
however, it did connect on-line to Autodin, served both the fleet center
and the on-base message center and allowed enlisted personnel to
switch from a two to a four section watch bill.
All in all the initial efforts in automation ashore were rather
modest, affected few commands and for the most part were merely one
time measures to meet an existing problem. There were two primary
reasons for this. First, as with any new development, automation of
communications was a complex and difficult task. There were many
doubting Thomases -- old line communicators who were not convinced
that a computer could be more reliable than a radioman. The other
reason was that funds necessary for the development of automation
were not forthcoming. Funding slipped from year to year due to other
higher priority programs, the lack of any consolidated concerted effort
in this direction was the decisive factor.
11

A series of events in 1967 and 1968 including the LIBERTY,
PUEBLO, and EC- 121 aircraft incidents gave new impetus to the auto-
mation program. I shall not go into these incidents in detail here but
the failures in communications (as well as poor judgement) were
responsible for situations developing which not only proved embarassing
to our government but also resulted in the loss of life.
«
As a result of these unfortunate incidents both Congress and the
Defense Department were spurred to action and the Automation Program
took on new life. In 1967, the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated
a letter [Ref. 3] establishing the Naval Communications Automation
Program and the attendant policy guidance. Specifically, "The program
will be based on a systems concept consisting of two primary modular-
ized system components of standardized software and hardware. These
components will be:
(1) The Local Digital Message Exchange, (LDMX) , a message
processor system for interface with Autodin, to meet
requirements for distribution of on-base record communi-
cations .
(2) The Naval Communications Processing and Routing System,
(NAVCOMPARS) , a processing and routing system for
tactical broadcast, ship-shore, and ship-ship application,
afloat and ashore."
B. PROGRAM CONCEPT
The situation was one of steadily worsening conditions accen-
tuated by several very real crises which made it imperative that Naval
12

communications be automated if the fleet commands and forces afloat
were to be responsive to the National Command Authority in the near
and far future. The transition between a manual and an automated
facility was and is complex and required step-by-step planning prior
to implementation. These steps have a significant impact on the cost
structure, particularly if significant changes occur in the technology
without the anticipated impact being evaluated in terms of the costs
involved
.
The steps outlined below formed the basis for developing the
overall approach to the automation of Naval communications. Based
upon the history of both Naval communications technology and ADP
technology, these steps were laid out in an orderly progression which
allowed for technological changes without complete disruption of
planned milestones.
In order to achieve the desired objective of providing Navy users
with the fast and accurate communications system necessary to support
their communications requirements, it was decided that the program
would be installed in three stages.
This evolutionary approach to system design was selected in
order to satisfy the communication's requirements of the specific users
at each installation, while still contributing to the total system ob-
jectives. Hardware and software common to the system, but adapted
as necessary for each user, was designed to make this possible. The
13

three progressive degrees of automation were designated as: (A) Initial;
(B) Interim LDMX/NAVCOMPARS; and (C) Full Automation.
Before analyzing these three stages however, I think it is rele-
vant to consider several of the more important reasons why this interim
route was chosen in lieu of a total package concept.
First there is the fact that many Naval Commands are not aware
of the telecommunications implications of their ADP systems. As a
result Naval Communicators are being advised almost daily of new
requirements for information exchange. It is prudent to get an interim
system installed before sizing up the system specifications for the
next stage in the Automation program. This problem of identifying
communications and information flow requirements is a separate, serious
issue which deserves intensive review as a project of its own.
Additionally there is a problem of reliably terminating HF trans-
mission paths on-line to Autodin. When satellite transmission paths
are available for all ships and stations (in about five years) much less
trouble is anticipated, but until then messages originated at sea can-
not be transmitted on-line to Autodin.
Finally, no vendor has come up with a reliable machine which
will produce multiple-page messages, staple them together, and then
distribute them to an office or pneumatic tube automatically. The
absence of such a device introduces a severe impediment to the attain-
ment of a truly automated message processing system. Until the
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development of such a unit is accomplished, a number of error prone,
expensive, slow moving humans will remain in the system. No RDT&E
funds will be available until FY 74 for this purpose, but nearly 4 million
dollars has been set aside for such an endeavor in the period FY 74-76,
when this problem will hopefully be resolved [Ref. 4, p. B-7] .
1 . Initial Phase
Specifications for the LDMX were prepared and submitted
for competitive bid during 19 69 under Automatic Data Processing
Selection Office (ADPESO) Project 004-69 [Ref. 4, p. 7-1] . This
specification was written for the lease of an LDMX for the Naval Message
Center in the Pentagon and contained options for an additional 13 LDMX
systems to be leased over a three year period. Facilities identified by
the specification for the optional systems were to be altered to reflect
recent planning and operational changes as they occurred. During 1970
and prior to delivery of the Pentagon LDMX, portions of currently avail-
able LDMX software were recoded in Cobol to afford some degree of
standardization and facilitate user interface. A maximum effort was
directed toward the collection and review of new communications re-
quirements which were generated in support of ADP facilities. Con-
solidations of communications subscribers and transmission facilities
was a focal point in planning considerations. Actions also were
initiated to update Naval Communications doctrine, policy and pro-
cedures as necessary to reflect changes resulting from an automated/data
15

oriented communications environment. During the Initial Phase,
COMNAVCOMM and supporting commands and offices undertook a
systematic program of acquainting senior staff members in ADP disci-
plines and technology, and developed the resources required to
coordinate and monitor the day-to-day actions required to carry out
this plan.
A test bed facility was established and manned for the
purpose of developing, testing, and debugging software for operational
systems. This test bed also serves as a means for training operator,
programmer, and maintenance personnel. Additionally, simulation
scenarios developed for the test bed serve to run sensitivity analysis,
testing the LDMX reaction to changing operational environments. The
test bed will remain in operation until the end of the program when it
will be moved to the final site where it will be installed as an operational
unit [Ref. 4, p. 7-1] .
2. The Interim LDMX/NAVCOMPARS
The interim phase of automation covers the time period
1971 to 1976 and thus is the one currently under execution. This phase
includes the preparation of specifications and procurement of the hard-
ware and software for designated installations and operation on an
integrated basis. System capability will be monitored, upgraded, and
modified as new equipment, software and additional interface
16

capabilities are developed and Naval Communications evolves toward
the third, a fully automated phase.
During this phase the 13 additional LDMX/NAVCOMPAR's
mentioned in the Initial Phase will be implemented on a modular basis.
During the final stages of implementation, communications doctrine,
procedures and format will have been standardized to the point that
terminals can be classified in terms of volume, speed and format
(computer, narrative, data, etc.) [Ref. 4, p. 7-2].
3 . Full Automation Phase
The third and final phase involves conversion of individually
operated installations into a single system. This is to be accomplished
by implementing fixed or standard doctrine, procedures and formats
throughout the system, conversion of remaining manually oriented
computer functions, implementation of software which will allow free
exchange and coordination between the LDMX/NAVCOMPARS systems
for the purpose of reporting problems, sharing workloads, exchanging
routing information, automatic servicing and routing. It will also
provide an on-line interface between computers, or man and computers.
The LDMX/NAVCOMPARS of Phase III will also allow more efficient
utilization of consolidated communications transmission facilities and
more rapid exchange of formatted information. A complete description
cannot be offered until experience gained during Phases I and II has
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been documented and properly analyzed from a systems approach.
Phase III is due to commence in 1976 and will be concluded by the
early 1980's [Ref. 4, p. 7-3].
C. SYSTEM DESIGN
1. NAVCOMPARS
Up to this point the term LDMX/NAVCOMPARS has been
utilized as a single phrase in designating the overall system. While
it is true that there are numerous similarities between LDMX and
NAVCOMPARS, it is equally as true that they are separate and unique
entities designed to perform two separate and distinct functions under
very different environments. The LDMX is designed to automate high
volume communication activities such as CNO's telecommunications
center in the Pentagon while the NAVCOMPARS is designed to automate
the functions of the major communications stations. Although the
primary thrust of this paper involves an analysis only of the LDMX, a
brief discussion of the NAVCOMPARS for the sake of clarity is called
for at this point before a detailed discussion of the LDMX can properly
take place.
The NAVCOMPARS provides for the unique Naval requirement
for interfacing with the operational fleets via multi-channel ship/shore
circuits, broadcast and other means. In terms of actual installations
only six Naval Communications Stations are scheduled to receive the
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NAVCOMPARS, three in the Atlantic — Norfolk, London, and Naples
and three in the Pacific — Guam, San Diego, and Honolulu. Ships
may still terminate with any communication station but their traffic
will be processed and entered into Autodin through these six stations.
These six sites are supposedly also going to be the six
NAVCOMMSTA's which will serve as the ground terminal access points
for the Navy Satellite Program currently under development.
Each NAVCOMPARS installation is a fully redundant system
utilizing two separate processors (one on-line, one in a backup mode)
and dual access to Autodin. Each NAVCOMPARS has the additional
ability to be outfitted with LDMX software modules as required to satisfy
local user requirements without impairing the normal NAVCOMPARS
functions.
The NAVCOMPARS as set up for NAVCOMMSTA Norfolk,
which will receive the prototype system, provides automated message
processing for the fleet center as well as the message center and
Autodin center. These automated functions include on-line interface
to Autodin, the fleet broadcasts, full period ship/shore terminations of
land-line quality, dedicated land-line channels, and message center
processing and internal routing. The most salient feature is the capa-
bility to automatically key the fleet broadcasts on-line from the
NAVCOMPARS. This represents a significant milestone in the Naval
Communications Automation Program. Other automated functions
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[Ref. 10, p. 8] of the prototype NAVCOMPARS include:
* Format conversion (ACP 12 6 to ACP 128)
* Message file and recall
* Guard list processing and filing
* Suspected duplicate detection
* Message accountability
* Processing (and queing) by precedence
* Security protection
* Message error format detection
* Statistical reporting
2 . LDMX - System Architecture
The LDMX system provides a complete message center
capability for high-volume communication activities. It is an on-line
system for message input, error checking, storage, and distribution.
The interim LDMX system uses leased, commercial, off-the-shelf ADP
hardware. The main processor is the UNIVAC Series 70/45 (formerly
RCA Spectra 70/45), using the contractor-provided communication
operating software system. The software programs for specific communi-
cations applications were developed by the Naval Command Systems
Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT); they are written partially in Cobol
(about 25%) with the remainder in assembly language [Ref. 10, p. 5],
Figure 1 provides the system information flow diagram for the LDMX
and forms the basis for the following system description.
a. Incoming
Incoming narrative messages [Ref. 7, p. 13] are
received via Autodin and dedicated teletypes terminating in the on-line



























(mail, etc.) require manual preparation for entry into the processor.
The most desirable input media for these messages would be via
Optical Character Reader (OCR). The on-line processor will also
accept incoming traffic in the other modes shown including magnetic
tape, cards, and paper tape.
After the message has been received it will be stored
on disk (In-Process File) written to magnetic tape (History File) for
recovery purposes and queued for processing. Messages received by
teletype carry an identifying channel sequence number. The system
compares the messages received for numbers out of sequence and sets
an indicator for out of sequence numbers. The system then generates
a notice to the Service Clerk for appropriate action. Messages will
be processed from the queue by precedence. Each message will be
analysed, removing message control and identifying fields for filing
and editing of the message. Based on commands addressed, guard list,
Standard Subject Identification Codes (SSIC) , flagwords, Address
Indicating Groups (AIG) and references, the system will assign internal
distribution.
Before continuing, a brief description of the procedure
involved in assigning the internal distribution for a Naval message
should help clarify this process for those who are unfamiliar with the
system. In the commercial world, a piece of correspondence is sent
from one organization to another. Normally it will indicate the
22

individual within the organization for whom it is intended. This is not
the case with Naval messages. Nearly all messages are sent only
from command to command, rarely, if ever, does a message take on a
personal tone where it is from one individual to another. The problem
then is obvious, once the message center at a given command receives
a message, how does it determine who within the command should see
it and who should be responsible for taking whatever action the message
calls for. Suffice it to say that although many techniques have been
tried, none has ever proven completely successful. There remains a
considerable need for system improvement in this phase of message
processing.
Once the determination of the correct internal dis-
tribution has been made, the complete unedited message with internal
distribution assigned will be filed on the mass storage unit (45 day
MSU Journal File) and written on magnetic tape (six month magnetic
tape Journal File). The disk will contain-an index to facilitate random
accessing of the messages on the mass storage unit. Under ideal
conditions, a message will be processed through the system without
operator assistance (about 70% currently in the Pentagon). Messages
with processing restrictions or format errors (such as bad Date Time
Group (DTG) , invalid classification, missing From line, no routing
indicator (RI) or command addressed or inaccurate command, AIG or
short title) will necessitate the message processing programs be'
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assisted in the processing of messages by a Video Data Terminal
(VDT) operator (INROUTER). In the above instances the Inrouter may
correct the format error(s) and then route the message. The Inrouter
may also assign distribution, or when necessary, reject messages
from the system. In the event of a rejected message (non-correctable
format errors or misrouted messages), an unedited copy of the message
will be printed at the Service Clerk position with an entry indicating
the reason for rejection. After the message has been processed, it
will be printed on a reproducible mat in an edited format without com-
munications prosigns and signals but with the internal routing in-
structions added, and then logged-out of the system by printing summary
information on a teleprinter.
The remote printers permit the delivery of selected
traffic in an advance copy mode to designated areas. In the Pentagon
for instance, the only remote printer is located in CNO's Flag Plot where
advance copies of certain messages based on subject code and pre-
cedence are made available to the duty officer.
Incoming data communications will be received in
data pattern format (80-data-character or variable-line-block messages).
Initial processing will be the same as for incoming narrative traffic
with the major difference occurring in the output format where either
magnetic tape or punched cards may be utilized.
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A monitor teleprinter will record all incoming dedi-
cated traffic. In addition to the circuit monitor, the system will
maintain a Message and Service Log. The Message Log will receive
an entry for all incoming and outgoing messages that are processed by
the system. The Service Log will receive entries for each message
that is annotated "Service" in the drop line. This log is intended to
assist the Service Clerk by making him aware of messages awaiting
service action.
b. Outgoing
Outgoing communications [Ref. 7, p. 22] may be
introduced into the system via the paper tape reader, card reader,
magnetic tape, or preferably through the on-line OCR. The system
will accept record communications in either JANAP 12 8, ACP 127, ACP
126 or Message form DD 173 format for use with the OCR. The system
will recognize the format upon entry and validate the start of message
and end of message. After validation, the processor will output either
an accept or reject notice to the operator via an outgoing log. Together
with the action notice, the processor will output a unique header line
for identification of the message. Messages which are accepted will
be assigned a Processing Sequence Number (PSN) and queued for pro-
cessing by precedence.
The program first validates the content of the option
format lines and elements supplied with the message. If the program
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cannot assign a Routing Indicator automatically, it will display the
address line to a VDT operator (OUTROUTER). The outrouter may assign
the correct RI, place messages on a hold queue, reject the message
from further processing, or correct the short title of the addressee. A
system status, containing accounting information pertinent to all of
the messages on the hold queue, will be displayed to the outrouter, via
the VDT, on demand by the operator. The outrouter then may retrieve
any message on the hold queue by its queue number. If the message
is rejected, it will not be recorded in the system, but a reject notice
will be printed on the Outgoing Log.
After all routing has been appended to the message,
the preparation program will assign Own Station Routing Indicator,
Station Sequence Number and Time of File to the message. It is then
paged and sectioned according to JANAP 12 8 and sent out over the
appropriate transmission medium.
Most messages require no review after these auto-
matic processes. However, after preparation of General Messages,
Top Secret, and SPECAT messages for transmission, they are automatically
presented to the outrouter via his VDT. After reviewing the message




Data messages may be introduced into thesystem
via magnetic tape or card. During message preparation, processing,
transmission, and filing, the same controls and restraints used for
narrative traffic will apply.
The system maintains data on-line to assist in
message processing. The data base can logically be divided into two
segments: the Message Data originated as a result of all messages
received for processing (the History and Journal Files discussed
previously) and secondly, all Support Data maintained on the remaining
disk. This data is organized within the system to permit access by
the processing programs. The content of this data is controlled by
the Communications Center Personnel and includes:
* The Command Guard List
* Multiple Addressee Guard List
* Long Title File
* Standard Subject Identification Code (SSIC) List
* Flagword List
* Command Distribution Guide Files
* Subject Files
The system provides the capability to retrieve pre-
viously processed messages automatically. This is done by entering
the message identification parameters via one of the VDT's. Retrieval
of Top Secret or Special Category Messages can only be requested via
the computer operator's console however.
In the event of failure of the 70/45, a 65K RCA 1600
Autodin Communications Controller (ACC) is configured with extra
27

memory and additional peripheral switching capabilities that will permit
the ACC to continue to receive Autodin traffic on paper tape, card,
magnetic tape, and a medium speed printer. This will permit the
terminal to function as a multi-media terminal and the output of the
printer may be used for the manual processing of Communications Center
traffic. The system will generate a magnetic tape log entry of each
message incoming, outgoing, or locally entered for logging in the
format of the system. The log tapes with all incoming traffic are known
as Terminal Tapes and are used in recovering Autodin and dedicated




A. THE EFFORT TO DATE
1 . Requirements
The guidelines for conducting the required economic
analysis for proposed Department of Defense investments are contained
in DODINST 7041.3 of 26 February 1969. It delineates the steps to be
followed and the format to be utilized in conducting an economic
analysis
.
The instruction defines an economic analysis as: " A
systematic approach to a given problem, designed to assist the manager
in solving a problem of choice. The full problem is investigated; ob-
jectives and alternatives are searched out and compared in the light
of their benefits and costs through the use of an appropriate analytical
framework."
SECNAVINST 7000.14 of 30 January 1970 implemented the
DOD Instruction and established policy and procedures for consistent
application of economic analysis within the Navy.
SECNAVINST 5231.1 of 2 5 February 1972 provided a standard
discipline and framework for managing and justifying Automatic Data
System development from inception through to full operation. OPNAVINST
5231.1 of 30 May 1972 implements this instruction and establishes the
29

evaluation requirements upon which the analysis of systems like the
LDMX must be based.
OPNAVINST 5231.1 requires that the ADS Development
Plan conform to a highly structured two part format. Part I -- The
Economic Analysis Synopsis -- introduces the proposed ADS develop-
ment, conversion, or major revision. It is a synopsis of the economic
analysis presented in Part II. It is designed to permit the system
proponent to highlight those key elements which are essential to
understanding the analysis; to illuminate critical requirements; to
substantiate these requirements in terms of mission objectives; and
to validate the particular approach chosen to satisfy them.
Part II -- The Economic Analysis -- presents the analytical
justification of the proposed ADS development, conversion, or major
revision introduced in Part I. It is separated into nine discrete sections
for the expressed purpose of: (1) outlining a step-by-step process for
conducting economic analysis of proposals supported by ADS; and
(2) amplifying the nature and scope of economic analysis procedures
delineated in SECNAVINST 7000.14.
Part II, Section 8 -- Benefits — is the most relevant
segment in the evaluation here. This section states that benefits are
to be expressed in terms of measures of effectiveness related to satis-
fying the objectives of the functional operations supported by the ADS.
The principal task to be undertaken in formulating the benefits portion
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of the analysis is to isolate the measures of effectiveness in terms of
the objectives of the ADS application. There is no unique collection
of measures of effectiveness applicable to every analysis. Further,
the number of different measures of effectiveness inherent to each
analysis is largely a function of the complexity of the ADS under con-
sideration.
2 . Approach
The approach taken in complying with the requirements set
forth by this instruction is illustrative of one of the major problems
in Naval communications today. The problem, which has been touched
upon previously, is the inability to measure effectiveness or to determine
the benefits (if any) offered by a given communications system. The
application of existing analytical evaluation techniques is virtually
unheard of.
The project office responsible for implementing the auto-
mation program was understaffed and inexperienced in producing such
a document so a decision was made to bring in a private consulting
firm to perform this task. In the resulting analysis [Ref. l] , which
totalled several hundred pages, only four pages were devoted to the
benefits which were to be realized from the LDMX and these were out-
lined only in very general terms. In fact there were no actual measures
of effectiveness developed in the entire analysis. Most of the benefits
were couched in phrases such as "anticipated benefits" and "it is
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expected." In brief, there was general agreement that the automated
system would perform better than the current manual system. No one
knew how much better but everyone was sure that it was at least as
good. Making this assumption about effectiveness, the justification
for proceeding with the LDMX was based on the fact that substantial
cost savings would be realized by automating.
It is unfair to fault the consulting firm since they were
brought in during the middle of the program. A commitment had already
been made to go with the LDMX project so all they could do was to
provide the best possible cost analysis. Their basic function was to
determine how much money would be saved by automating and to provide
an analysis to determine whether it would be more economical to lease
or buy the automated system.
The program was too far down the line to run a true cost-
effectiveness study on whether or not this was the optimal system for
a given level of inputs. It would have been pointless to develop a
methodology to determine the optimum system when it was too late
to do much about it. The instruction does, however, require that
effectiveness be measured and this should be complied with. Ignoring
or paying only lip service to the analysis of benefits does not make
the problem disappear.
One possible method of meeting this obligation shall be
set forth in the following section. The most fundamental approach is
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to devise several measures of effectiveness, one for each of the stated
objectives, and then to compare these measures as applied to the
existing manual system at a given site and to the automated system
which is going to replace it. Such a comparison would not provide all
the information that is necessary for a complete analysis, but it would
be a start.
It may be argued that such an approach will produce in-
accurate, incomplete, or biased analytic data. It may also be argued
that what is required is an all-encompassing model that analyzes the
processing requirements and adjusts the available resources so that
an optimal system is attained. It is the author's belief, however,
that what is called for here is some simplified way of dealing with the
problem of two existing systems, the LDMX and the manual system.
The only way to do this is to actually measure the performance of both
for a given set of criteria
.
An actual evaluation of the two systems will not be con-
ducted here, only the proposed methodology for arriving at some given
measure of effectiveness will be explained. An actual application of
these proposals will become the responsibility of those who are able
to attain freer access to the necessary data than the author.
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B. TWO MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Although separate Measures of Effectiveness (MOE's) could be
developed for each of the requirements or stated objectives of the
processing systems, in the interest of brevity only two will be pre-
sented here. The two that have been selected are illustrative of what
can be done with available analytical tools and are offered more as
examples than as requirements. They were selected because of their
importance to the success of the system. During the three major crises
that developed as a result of poor communications during the late 60's
— the LIBERTY, PUEBLO, and EC-121 -- the two most critical problems
were: (1) delays in processing and (2) misrouted and non-delivered
messages. It is for these reasons that processing speed and reliability
of delivery have been selected for analysis.
1 . Processing Speed
Delays in message processing in many cases result in a
degradation of the content of the message. Prolonged or exaggerated
waiting times prior to the servicing of the message normally results
in reduced effectiveness. Thus the expected waiting time in a
priority network system can be considered to be directly related to
the effectiveness of the system and provides an excellent starting
point for a discussion of a given communications system.
It should be pointed out that within the Navy it is a function
of each message originator to assign a precedence to each message he
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sends out. This assignment is a value judgement of the originator
based on message content and the time relevance of delivery. The
four classes currently utilized with their requirements for processing
time are:
(1) FLASH less than two minutes;
(2) IMMEDIATE — less than five minutes;
(3) PRIORITY -- less than 30 minutes; and
(4) ROUTINE -- less than one hour.
None of these objectives is met by the existing manual system but
attainment of this level of performance is one of the most important
stated objectives of the LDMX [Ref. 4, p. 5-2].
Problems of this type are classified as queing or waiting
line problems. This specific type of problem is referred to as a
priority system because each message precedence constitutes a
separate priority class. Messages arriving with a higher precedence
displace all units of lower precedence in the waiting line. Messages
of low priority may only be serviced if there are no messages of higher
priority waiting to be processed. Within each precedence class, the
order of processing is by arrival or first- in first-out.
Since the criterion to be measured here is the time a
message of a given precedence spends in the LDMX, if the delay ex-
ceeds the prescribed time limits listed above then the performance
must be rated at something less than 100%.
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Logically the performance index must decrease as the
excess time delay increases. The following equation, which was
developed in a slightly different form by Lydell [Ref . 6] , was selected
as being representative of this relationship and thus most appropriate
for this purpose: / ^ \




for t -^ T
where:
P = performance index for precedence "p" messages,
T = maximum desirable time delay for precedence "p" messages,
t = actual time delay required for satisfactory processing of
precedence "p" messages.


















One method of obtaining delay time statistics is to actually
measure the delays encountered by each precedence category under
various operating conditions. The LDMX currently produces a daily
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report from which the following information can be extracted:
1 . Number of messages of each precedence per day,
2 . Number of messages of each classification per day,
3. Average handling time for each precedence per day,
4. Average handling time for each classification per day,
5. Average handling time for all messages processed for
each one hour period throughout the day.
It would appear that a simple modification to the program
which produces this daily formatted report could provide the data nec-
essary to implement this simple performance index.
Since there are no ongoing reports which provide this type
of information for the current manual system the collection of data for
this system would be a more difficult problem to overcome. It is
believed, however, that the results of such an effort would be worth
the time, effort, and money required.
Care must be taken in all of these measurements since
they will consist of an average of all messages over a given period of
time (e.g., hour, day, month, etc.). As such, the longer the period
of time involved the more the smoothing effect of the averaging process
will come into play. The result of this process will be to reduce the
impact which those messages that require an excessive amount of time
will have on the performance index. For each category, there should
be an upper time limit after which any message of a given precedence
which exceeds this limit would be reported so that those few messages
which experience excessive delays will be recognized.
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Another approach to this problem would be to compare two
systems only for the average time involved in processing the slowest
25% of all messages of a given precedence over a period of time. This
approach assumes that 75% of all messages will be processed in close
to the required time and that the point of interest should focus on
those messages which experience the most serious delays. By concen-
trating on this smaller family of messages, a more accurate comparison
could be made between alternative systems.
2 . Reliability of Delivery
Professor Norman F. Schneidewind has done a significant
amount of research in the field of computer software reliability. He
points out that a total reliability analysis for a computer system, such
as the one involved here, must consider all aspects of the problem in-
cluding software, hardware, and the human operators involved. A
total reliability analysis would address the reliability requirements of
each major subsystem, and for each component within a subsystem.
Within the hardware subsystem, reliability estimates should be pro-
vided for the central processing unit, disks, magnetic tapes, and other
peripheral units. Within the software subsystem, reliability estimates
should be provided for each module or program [Ref. Ill .
Relatively little work has been done in the areas of soft-
ware and human operator reliabilities, despite the fact that these sub-
systems are as important as hardware in determining total system
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reliability. It is not the intent to conduct an in depth investigation of
this problem, but rather to point out that the problem exists and that it
merits greater attention. This problem becomes particularly relevant in
view of a second stated objective of the LDMX program: "To reduce
misroutes and non-deliveries to one in 10 million" [Ref. 4, p. 5-2] .
Restating this objective in more manageable terms will help
place it in a better perspective. Currently the CNO's Telecommunications
Center handles approximately 4,000 messages per day. At this rate the
one in 10 million objective means that only one message will be lost
or misrouted at that site during the next seven years. A commendable
objective even if it is one that stretches the imagination, particularly in
view of the difficulties enumerated above.
In order to accurately measure the reliability of delivery for
this, or any other communication system, an extensive acknowledgement
or hand-shaking type of reporting system would have to be employed.
For each message sent out the ultimate receiver would have to send back
an acknowledgement notifying the originator of receipt. Such a system
is obviously infeasible because of the expense and overloading it would
create in the system. It might be possible through an extensive simulation
exercise to evaluate the performance of a given system prior to placing
it on-line. In this way the probability that misroutes and non-deliveries
would or would not occur could be determined for a given system. Any-
thing else seems to be beyond the realm of possibility at the present time.
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Existing data on this problem is quite unreliable. Most
message centers and communications stations report a very low number
of misroutes and non-deliveries^on an annual basis. There is general
unease about these figures due to the feeling that the reported lost
messages represent only the tip of the iceberg so to speak. The only
messages ever identified as being lost are those that come to light
because someone was expecting a reply and didn't receive one or some
required report was not received. In those cases tracer action can be
initiated and it can be determined where the message went awry. For
the great majority of messages which go out unannounced and for which
no reply is required the originator merely hopes that it reaches its final
destination. No one can estimate how many of these messages never
reach their destination.
It is interesting to note that in those crisis situations which
resulted in thorough investigations of the communication failures, a
surprisingly high number of lost and misrouted messages turned up. In
the LIBERTY crisis alone more messages were lost and misrouted than
the Naval Communications Station in San Francisco claimed it lost in
all of calendar year 1972. These thoroughly documented failures generate
the lack of confidence in the stated reports of delivery reliability.
Until a more adequate method of identifying these lost
messages can be devised, any analysis of the data available will be
biased in the direction of an over-favorable performance index. The
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solution to this dilemma is beyond the scope of this paper and the
author's competence. A methodology can be devised based on the data
which is available that will compare the reliability of delivery between
alternative systems. If one assumes that each suffers the same magni-
tude of under-statement of the problem, then comparatively speaking
the better system in terms of reliability should be recognizable.
The measure developed below is similar in some respects
to the measure proposed in the preceding section on processing speed.
Basically the reliability index should decrease as the number of identi-
fiable misroutes and non-deliveries increases. The following equation




RI = The reliability index for a given system,
N = The total number of non-deliveries and misroutes
over a given period of time,
T.= The total messages processed during that period
of time
K = A scalar quantity designed to provide a greater
spread in the index.
For example, if the CNO Telecommunication Center processes
4,000 messages per day and using a scalar quantity of K = .0001 , then
the reliability index for the various values of N lost messages for a
















Other examples using different values for T and K would
obviously provide different indexes. The example given above
adequately illustrates the procedure however.
C. EVALUATING FUTURE SYSTEMS
The previous discussion has been restricted to an analysis of the
increased effectiveness provided by the LDMX when compared to the
manual system it is replacing. The more valuable application for the
techniques of cost-effectiveness analysis, however, should come in
developing a follow-on system to the LDMX, The LDMX should not be
viewed as an end in itself, but only as an interim system on the road
to a more fully automated system of the future. As such, an inordinate
amount of time should not be devoted to the LDMX, but rather the emphasis
should be placed on devising a methodology to ensure that, whatever
form the follow-on system may take, it will be the optimal one from a
cost-effectiveness standpoint. Analysis of previous projects can be
helpful in pointing out planning pitfalls to avoid in future efforts and
from this standpoint an analysis of the LDMX is beneficial. From a
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cost standpoint though, the LDMX project should be viewed as water
under the bridge. It is similar to a sunk cost and of value only when
viewed from a historical perspective. The only costs of interest to
the planner are those that can be controlled, the costs of the future.
A primary shortcoming in development of the LDMX was the approach
taken in the initial system design. After the various communications
crises in the late 60' s, when the order came to get the people out of
the system the response was predictable. Following the path of least
resistance it was determined that the application of automated data pro-
cessing equipment to existing procedures would provide an adequate
response. There was no significant effort to evaluate the processing
stream of events or to streamline management policies and procedures,
the message for the most part goes through the same sequence of events
as before, it just goes faster and more reliably now because machines
are doing the work. This is the same approach taken by industry a
decade ago when computers really came into their own in business appli-
cations. There was no effort to change the thinking involved, there
was only an application of hardware to the old method of doing things.
The first task that must be accomplished in devising a new system
should be a review of the entire managerial approach to the problems
at hand. How should the mission be defined? What are the goals or
objectives to be attained? Are they realistic and relevant to the problem?




More specifically, the question of how to accurately evaluate the
worth of a message must be resolved. What should a commander be
willing to pay to receive a Flash message? What value should be placed
on security? How much does it cost to ensure that no messages are
misrouted or non-delivered? Is it reasonable to be willing to pay these
prices? If processing speed can be increased so that all messages can
be received in ten minutes but as a result Flash messages now take
eight minutes, is this a reasonable or desirable tradeoff? Little work
has been done in this area but these are the kinds of questions that
must be addressed before any intelligent decisions can be made in
designing communications systems for the future.
1 . Time Value of a Message
There have been several recent approaches to the problem
of determining the value of a message. One of the most interesting
[Ref. 16], was conducted by Professor A. R. Washburn while he was a
resident at the Naval Communications Command in Washington. Pro-
fessor Washburn performed two experiments relevant to the determination
of a price of time for Naval messages:
(1) a survey of the opinions of a group of people
familair with Naval messages; and
(2) an attempt to discover the price of time that would




A brief summary of this study is included here because of
the insight such an approach gives to determining the value of a message.
The quantity of interest throughout the first experiment was
the price of time for Naval messages, which was defined to be the
amount of money that the Navy ought to be willing to pay to shorten the
writer-to-reader time by one hour. Each respondent was required to
place a monetary value on the penalty to be assessed for a one hour
delay in the arrival of a message for each of the four precedence classes.
Each respondent also estimated the maximum penalty to be assessed
(in dollars) no matter how long the time delay. This was essentially
to determine the penalty for losing a message of a given precedence
class
.
The Delphi technique, which is a method for obtaining the
opinion of a group of people by obtaining repeated personal estimates
with feedback in between, was utilized in conducting the actual survey.
The survey was repeated three times, in each case showing the partici-
pants the results of the previous survey. Estimates tended to get smaller
with each survey. The median results of the final survey were $1, $10,
$100, and $1,000 for the four prices of time and $50, $500, $1,000 and
$10,000 for the four maximum penalties. In each case these prices




The second phase of the study attempted to infer a price
of time by examining decisions that have been made in the past involving
a tradeoff between time and money. The system which was selected for
evaluation was a telecommunications center serving several remote
commands. The installation or non- installation of Electronic Courier
Service (versus manual pickup) to the remote users was utilized to
provide estimates of the price of time, since the required data could be
measured or accurately estimated.
The mechanics of the analysis are not of particular importance
and have been omitted here. The conclusions, which are important, were
difficult to determine. Suffice it to say that the estimates varied con-
siderably, and were in fact, inconsistent with each other in some
instances. Of primary importance, though, was the degree that the
actual costs varied from those called for by the survey of knowledgeable
men conducted earlier. Professor Washburn estimated that based on the
results of the second analysis the actual costs involved were more on
the order of $.10, $1.00, $10.00, and $200 per hour for the four
precedences. The "maximum penalty" numbers were not involved here
and could not be estimated.
The actual numbers are not the really important point but
rather this type of analysis furnishes one example of what can be done
in rethinking the time-honored policies upon which current operations
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are based. It is through this form of research that a more realistic
attitude to the problems confronting Naval Communications can be
attained.
2 . Economic Theory
Economic theory is another discipline which should be
applied to some of these problems. The marginal theory involved in
evaluating the additional effectiveness to be gained by spending an
additional dollar should not be overlooked as a possibility in shedding
additional light on the situation.
The basis for economic theory involves an analysis of the
tradeoffs between various factors. In applying this tradeoff theory to
cost-effectiveness studies of systems such as the LDMX, several
relationships involving effectiveness come into focus.
Effectiveness (E) is equal to some function of the inputs




managerial expertise (M), and a level of technology (T)
,
then there should be some optimum mix of these input variables which
















Similarly, a measure of overall effectiveness (E) would also
be a function of some subset of "e's" which could be called output
measures. The previously discussed reliability and processing speed
are examples of these e's. For a given system configuration this subset
















Since the E in each case represents the same level of overall
performance then the effect of varying the different factors should be
readily apparent. If, for example, there are requirements that a given
system function at a set performance level for each of the e's, then E
will be fixed by these requirements. On the input side, if labor and
capital are limited to a given level, as they most surely will be in the
foreseeable future, and if technology is assumed to be limited by the
state of the art, then M will be the variable in question and such an
equation would provide the answer to the question of how much managerial
skill would be required to meet this commitment.
On the other side of the coin if all the inputs were fixed at
a given level then there would presumably be some optimal level of E
attainable under these circumstances. Employing the same logic as before
the tradeoffs between the various e's could be evaluated in terms of
meeting this overall level of E. Such a model, although very crudely
described here, with increased refinement, could provide very valuable
insights into optimizing any future system.
In fairness to the designers and developers of the Local
Digital Message Exchange, it should be pointed out that they were operating
under a very real time constraint. There was a need for a system now and
understandably they. chose the most expedient alternative in meeting the
requirement. The fact that they were able to get the LDMX "on the street"
utilizing off-the-shelf equipment that both improved the system and
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provided sizeable monetary savings, is a most commendable accomplish-
ment in itself. To undertake the reevaluation proposed above, which
involves fundamental changes in communications philosophy, would
have required more men, money, and time than was available.
Future systems, however, because of their cost and com-
plexity will no longer be able to rely on this short-range approach.
There is an obvious need to bring together users, engineers, systems
designers, system analysts, and cost analysts now to begin laying the
groundwork for this future system. Without this dual approach of re-
assessing basic communications philosophy and taking a total systems






The comments and observations made in the preceding pages have
purposely been limited to a single aspect of the overall communication
system. The intention has been to focus the discussion on one specific
aspect of the system in order to provide the reader with exposure both
to the total problem and to possible evaluation considerations which
have wider applicability to all Navy communication problems.
A paper such as this cannot be brought to a close however, with-
out recognizing and considering two important reports which have had a
significant impact on communications in the past two years. The first
report, titled "Review of Department of Defense World-Wide Communi-
cations," was conducted by the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee
of the House. Better known as the Mollohan report, after the Congressman
who headed the committee, it was published in two stages; Phase I on
10 May 1971 and Phase II on 12 October 1972. Although the Mollohan
report did cast a critical eye at Naval communications, it was directed
more toward the total military communications effort and the Defense
Communications System. The second important report is entitled the
"CNO Industry Advisory Committee for Telecommunications (CIACT)
Report" and focuses entirely on the current condition of Naval communi-
cations. Although the following comments shall be limited to those
portions of each report which speak to the problems of automation, the
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interested reader can attain a broader perspective through the critical
comments these two reports direct at all aspects of military and particu-
larly Naval communications.
A. THE MOLLOHAN REPORT
Phase I of the Mollohan Report reviews in detail the communications
failures involved in each of the three major crises in the late 19 60's --
the PUEBLO, LIBERTY, and EC-121. The subcommittee's analysis and
conclusions are best described with a quote from the report:
"Our examination of these three situations has caused
grave concern over the performance, which could be
expected from the Department of Defense Communi-
cations, generally, and the Defense Communications
System, specifically, in a general war situation. In
each of the situations examined by the subcommittee,
communications could be carried on under the most
favorable circumstances. No facilities had been
disabled, either temporarily or permanently; no enemy
jamming was experienced; and there was no restriction
upon use of any of the various modes of communica-
tions available. Despite those almost perfect communi-
cations conditions, messages were lost, misrouted
and missent, while others experienced intolerable
delays for instation processing." [Ref. 14, p. 15].
As noted earlier in this report, the primary objectives of the LDMX
program are aimed at rectifying these failures.
Phase II consists of an examination of the tactical communication
assets of the military departments and the management practices of DOD
and the military departments in procuring, operating, and maintaining




"10. Automated telecommunications center equipment
provides faster, more reliable and more responsive
communications, and requires fewer personnel for
its operation and maintenance. Despite those
operational and economic advantages, the military-
departments have delayed installing such equip-
ment for several years.
11. Excessive message processing time continues to
.
degrade the performance of all Department of
Defense communications systems. In 1971, while
only 2.2 minutes were required for transmission
of the average Flash message, more than 42 minutes
were required for processing such a message."
[Ref. 15, p. 16490].
In order to improve DOD communications systems the subcommittee
recommended that, among other things, the Secretary of Defense should:
"6. Accelerate the program for automating major tele-
communications centers. This program should be
closely coordinated with the program for interservice
consolidation of centers .
7. Initiate a department-wide program to reduce the time
consumed in processing messages." [Ref. 15, p. 19491].
These recommendations were amplified and explained in more de-
tail in a separate section of the report entitled "Delay in Automating
Communications Centers." Comments in this section included:
"Automated equipments, which drastically reduced the
manual operations in communications centers, have
been available for several years. Such equipments
provide faster, more reliable communications and
permit substantial reductions in the personnel re-
quired for operation of the centers. Despite those
advantages, only a few military communications
centers had been completely automated at the time
of our hearings. And, according to the schedules
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of the military departments, it will be about six
years before all of the major military communica-
tions centers are fully automated.
Since it appears firmly established that automation
provides a cost-effective means of obtaining im-
proved and more reliable military communications
with reduced operating personnel, the Department
of Defense should accelerate its programs for
automating major communications centers. Those
accelerated automation programs, however, should
be coordinated with the Department's program for
consolidation of collocated communications centers
in order to insure that maximum operational and
financial benefits will be obtained from all communi-
cation assets . " [Ref. 15, p. 16499].
B. THE CIACT REPORT
The importance of the CIACT Report lies in the fact that it concen-
trates entirely on Navy problems and was conducted at the direct request
of the Chief of Naval Operations. Of more direct interest to this paper,
it provides, among other things, the most thorough analysis of the role
of automation in Naval communications to be found anywhere.
The report consists of ten basic recommendations which must be
undertaken to upgrade Naval communications. Each of these recommen-
dations is supported in the basic report with a section of background
commentary. In addition to the basic report, each of the ten recommen-
dations has its own Action Group Report which includes the extensive
research effort, findings, and recommendations of the team of experts
who staffed the recommendation. Recommendation No. 4: Switching
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and Communication Automation, staffed by CIACT Action Group Team
No. Two, follows:
"That the Navy Telecommunications System be based
on switched, automated communications as the best
means to conserve manpower, make more effective use
of all available transmission circuits, and improve
quality, speed and timeliness of service; specifically:
the CNO direct that:
a. Director of Naval Telecommunications (DNT)
commit funds and resources immediately to de-
fine an automation program for application
throughout the system and establish it as a
top priority effort.
b. Chief of Naval Material (CHNAVMAT) develop a
family of communication switches (ships, sub-
marines, aircraft and shore stations) which
provide circuit switching, with store and for-
ward capability, to interconnect all available
transmission channels to voice, data, and
narrative message subscriber terminals.
c. DNT plan as a fundamental element of each
transmission system a capability to measure
and control circuit performance automatically
for on-line real time knowledge of acceptable
circuit routes
.
d. DNT implement as a feature of the overall
network a method of link-by-link error con-
trol and positive acknowledgement of the
receipt of information transmitted between
network nodes.
e. CHNAVMAT develop a family of low-cost input/
output terminal devices for ship and shore
application to be used for general message
traffic and voice-data applications.
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f . CHNAVMAT develop a family of input/output
terminal devices for specialized job-oriented
functions, such as a message-composer
terminal which handles formatted messages
when the transmission channel is constrained
to low bit rate.
g. CHNAVMAT accelerate the General Address
Reading Device (GARD) production from FY 74
to FY 73 and install fleetwide as an initial
step in small ship modernization.
h. CHNAVMAT continue the Message Processing and
Distribution System (MPDS) program to comple-
tion as planned for the CVA-68 and CVA-69 and
delay further implementation of MPDS until
evaluation of operating experience in these
ships is completed.
i. DNT continue the FY 73 plan for installing
leased Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX)
and Naval Communications Processing and
Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) , and add link-
by-link control procedures to the NAVCOMPARS.
j. CHNAVMAT accelerate development of an ex-
panded GARD capability (Small Ships Message
Processor and Distribution System) for improve-
ment of small ships communication capability.
k. DNT redirect, as dictated by system archi-
tecture planning, the current efforts to develop
equipments for accessing FLTSATCOM tactical
circuits (CUDIXS, SSTLXS, etc.)." [Ref. 2, p. 18].
Further analysis of the CIACT Report will be left to the interested
reader. Before leaving though one additional comment which symbolizes
the problem, is worthy of note:
56

"In general the Navy has lagged the other services
and the commercial world (by ten years or more) in
exploiting the potential of switching systems and
communications automation." [Ref. 2, p. 46].
C. SUMMARY
The evidence supporting the need for automation in message pro-
cessing appears incontrovertible. Pressure from Congress and from
within the Navy will undoubtedly result in an increasing reliance on the
computer and a further reduction of the human element.
As pointed out previously, the LDMX is not an end product. It is
but one component of the overall system. It is however, the first step
on the road to the more fully automated systems of the future. For this
reason, it is extremely important that the evaluation techniques employed
in analyzing the LDMX be appropriate and effective. The employment of
the correct techniques now will pave the road for the follow-on systems
of the future. The objective of course is to apply the developing tech-
nology wisely from the standpoint of the tradeoffs involved between cost
and effectiveness.
The increasing sophistication of the hardware, more stringent
operating requirements, and the increasing complexity involved in main-
taining communications between all of our forces will require an intel-
ligent, analytical approach if optimum systems are to be employed in the
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Following a series of incidents in the late 19 60's - including the PUEBLO,
LIBERTY, and EC 121 - the ineffectiveness of the existing communications system
became apparent. The call went out to "get the people out of the system" by automa-
ting as many manual functions as possible. The LDMX is one of the first systems
designed to correct these problems which has become operational.
Following the introduction, Section II describes the system architecture and the
sequence of operating events involved in message processing under this system.
Section III presents the requirements which must be met in evaluating such a system
and reviews the approach that was taken in meeting them. Two measures of effective-
ness are proposed for utilization in evaluating the performance of the LDMX. An addi-
tional effort is made to develop several evaluation techniques that could be helpful
in developing follow-on systems to the LDMX. Section IV concludes the paper with
a brief summary and a discussion of two reports which have had a significant impact
on military communications in the past two years.
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